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Due to the increased competition on capital markets and given the global 
importance of US markets, IFRS and US GAAP are competing to become the world 
standards set. Although comparable in many aspects, IFRS and US GAAP still differ in 
accounting for some transactions. This paper addresses the question whether specific 
accounting differences between IFRS and US GAAP determine the individual firm’s 
accounting standard preference. The results show that firms prefer that accounting regime 
that offers them the largest flexibility (i.e. less disclosure or more measurement options) 
on relevant accounting items (e.g. R&D expenditures). Furthermore, the flexibility in 




accounting differences, accounting regime choice, earnings quality 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In addressing the increasing cross-border dimension of investments, many 
European equity market regulators currently allow registrants to apply IFRS as an 
alternative to domestic standards (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Finland and Germany). The 
decision by the European Commission to require all companies listed on EU stock 
exchanges to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS by 2005 further 
highlights the increased support for IFRS. In becoming a world standard, IFRS is however 
in fierce competition with another accounting standard set, US GAAP. In some markets, 
both IFRS and US GAAP are even in direct competition (like on the German New 
Market). Inevitably, the strive for world leadership has led to a debate on which standards 
are the best, not in the slightest fed by the SEC’s persistence to demand a US GAAP 
reconciliation by US listed, foreign firms that apply IFRS.  
The quality debate also raises the question as to what determines a firm’s choice 
between IFRS and US GAAP. Similar to understanding the choices that are made within a 
standard set (e.g., LIFO versus FIFO), it is important to document factors that 
influence/determine the standard set choice. 
Previous studies (e.g., Ashbaugh 2001; El-Gazzar et al. 1999) have most often 
looked at standard set choice from an investor’s perspective. Since (outside) investors 
typically discount firm value for a lack of (transparent) information, it is argued that firms 
can benefit from choosing more transparent accounting standards (through a reduction in 
the cost of capital). Therefore, these studies contend that investor characteristics are 
typically taken into consideration when choosing an accounting standards set. Empirical 
evidence has, for example, found that larger firms with more diverse and geographically 
dispersed investors, where the information demand by investors is high and broad, often 
voluntarily switch from their local to a non-local GAAP (Ashbaugh 2001). 
The major contribution of the current study is that, instead of focusing on the 
investor side, we look at the companies themselves and investigate whether the 
incremental discretion offered within a standard set (relative to another set) over relevant 
accounting areas determines the accounting standard choice. Do firms prefer IFRS 
because there are more opportunities to capitalize certain costs such as development costs? 
Do they prefer US GAAP because acquisitions can be accounted for more freely? Those 
 
 
- 2 -considerations are important as they impact reported earnings, which in turn can influence 
the perceptions of investors.  
As the results of our study show, these accounting differences are indeed important 
when a firm has the choice between IFRS and US GAAP. Since capitalization of 
development costs is, for example, possible under IFRS and not under US GAAP, firms 
with large R&D expenditures are more likely to adopt IFRS. Similarly, IFRS leaves more 
discretion to management when accounting for share option plans, resulting in relatively 
more firms with share option schemes to choose IFRS. By contrast, firms that are highly 
active in the field of acquisitions and mergers are more likely to adopt US GAAP due to 
the multiple accounting alternatives offered by US GAAP on that issue. 
Given that these accounting differences determine the choice for IFRS or US 
GAAP, two questions can be raised. Firstly, do firms use the offered flexibility to better 
inform investors? And secondly, is there any value attached to reporting flexibility? 
Looking specifically at the flexibility IFRS offers with regard to R&D capitalization, we 
find that the accounting treatment of R&D expenditures increases earnings’ ability to 
explain returns/prices. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we first 
review the existing literature on accounting regime choice. Hypotheses are developed in 
section 3, while the model is further specified in section 4. Next, we describe the sample 
and data collection procedure, followed by both univariate and multivariate results 
presented in section 6. In section 7, we perform additional tests on the use and value of 





- 3 -2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
However scarce, the literature on standards set choice can be grouped into three 
areas: research on (1) the voluntary switch from local GAAP to IFRS (2) the voluntary 
switch from local GAAP to either IFRS or USGAAP and (3) the choice between IFRS and 
USGAAP.  
The first studies to address the issue of voluntary adoption of IFRS typically 
assume that managers are lead by investors’ preference for non-local GAAP as it results in 
more transparent and standardized information1. They find that investor characteristics 
such as size and having multiple listings (proxying for investor structure) are in a positive 
relation to the decision to adopt IFRS (Dumontier and Raffournier 1998, El-Gazzar et al. 
1999), while the financing policy (i.e., debt to equity ratio) appears to be in negative 
relation (El-Gazzar et al. 1999). In addition, they find that the international character of 
the firm, either measured by the percentage of international sales or by the percentage of 
foreign operations, is positively related to IFRS adoption. Finally, firms coming from a 
country that is a member of geographical and trade blocks in EU are more likely to apply 
IFRS.  
Next, we identify studies that consider both IFRS and US GAAP as opposed to 
local GAAP (Ashbaugh 2001, Cuijpers et al. 2002). Similar to the studies discussed 
above, it is found that the likelihood of using a non-local GAAP is increasing in the firm’s 
(relative) size, in the number of foreign equity markets on which the firm’s shares are 
traded and in the geographical dispersion of operations. In addition, being listed on a US 
exchange or on Nasdaq Europe and planning to issue stock in the following years more 
frequently leads to the usage of non-local GAAP. They also find an important impact of 
country characteristics. Firms are more likely to depart from local GAAP when IFRS is 
explicitly allowed as an alternative to local GAAP in that country and when there are a 
large number of disclosure and measurement differences between local and non-local 
GAAP.  
                                                 
1 Editing financial statements according to a world GAAP, compared to local GAAP, typically means that 
stricter measurement rules need to be applied, more disclosures are required and cross-country comparisons 
are possible. Overall, this results in more transparency and a greater detection of earnings management by 
investors (e.g., Hirst and Hopkins 1998). 
 
 
- 4 -Finally, there has been some research on the specific choice between IFRS and US 
GAAP. In their study on voluntary adoption of a non-local GAAP, both Ashbaugh (2001) 
and Cuijpers et al. (2002) for example have looked at the IFRS/US GAAP dilemma, 
addressing the same variables as in their local versus non-local GAAP comparison. 
Overall they find that firms are more likely to report IFRS financial information when they 
are relatively larger and when they participate in seasoned equity offerings. Moreover, this 
likelihood increases when US-GAAP (compared to IFRS) requires more accounting 
policy changes relative to what is required under firms’ domestic GAAPs, illustrating the 
impact of the home country on that choice. By contrast, being listed on a US exchange and 
having their shares traded on an increasing number of foreign equity markets is more often 
associated with firms reporting under US GAAP.  
Next to firms voluntarily choosing to report either under IFRS or US GAAP, there 
are also firms that are obliged to make that choice. In his study, Leuz (2003b) addresses 
these firms, and surprisingly finds that only larger financing needs are associated with US 
GAAP compliance. Firm size and firm performance seem to have no significant impact on 
the standard choice. 
Overall, these studies suggest that a firm’s choice is determined by the net-benefits 
of that choice, or that the benefits from applying one set of standards outweigh the costs. 
Benefits are mainly defined in terms of (minimization of) the cost of capital, while the 





In the present study, we further explore the IFRS/US GAAP choice and differences 
in characteristics of companies choosing a particular standard set. According to a recent 
KPMG survey (KPMG 2000), choosing a new set of standards is a strategic decision that 
typically occurs as firms want to raise new capital. In making a choice between different 
GAAPs, various factors, such as the preferences of investors and analysts, are being 
considered by management. Also more pragmatic issues such as the implementation costs 
                                                 
2 In most studies, these costs are either considered to be trivial, hard-to-measure or as one-time-off costs. In 
each case, no real attempt is made to measure these costs. 
 
 
- 5 -and internal reporting impact influence their decision. According to the respondents of that 
same survey, individual differences between IFRS and US GAAP have however no 
considerable influence on deciding which GAAP to adopt (KPMG 2000). However, 
Ashbaugh (2001) finds that differences in disclosure requirements and measurement 
methods between domestic standards and IFRS/US GAAP do have an impact on that 
choice. More specifically, she concludes that when US GAAP, compared to IFRS
3, 
requires more accounting policy changes relative to what is required under firms’ 
domestic GAAP, firms are more likely to report IFRS information.  
Building on Ashbaugh’s findings, we further test the importance of accounting 
differences. In particular, we argue that when differences between IFRS and US GAAP 
are relevant to the firm, management will eventually opt for the set with the least 
disclosure requirements and the most measurement choices4.  
Firstly, the item on which IFRS and US GAAP differ needs to be relevant to the 
firm. If firms rarely engage in transactions giving rise to that item, differences between 
standard sets on this item might not be a significant determinant of GAAP choice. The fact 
that the differences need to be relevant to the firm (in order to have an impact on the 
regime choice) is confirmed by the KPMG study. They find that, although overall the 
differences do not seem to have an impact, some firms, when presented with some 
individual differences, do judge that difference to be important. Among the more 
significant issues they quote: amorisation of goodwill, pooling of interest and employee 
equity compensation. This suggests that individual company’s circumstances need to be 
taking into consideration when investigating the impact of accounting differences on the 
choice of the standards set. 
Secondly, given that the accounting item is relevant to the firm, we propose that 
management prefers those accounting standards with minimum disclosure requirements. 
We argue that managers will try to limit mandatory disclosures and maintain as much 
discretion as possible in reporting voluntarily to the public (see also Fishman and Hagerty 
(1990)). This way, they don’t commit to more disclosures beforehand: they can make the 
                                                 
3 To illustrate this effect, Ashbaugh uses a grid, marking whether or not local GAAP has similar 
requirements as IFRS (US GAAP respectively) with regard to a selected number of disclosure items and 
measurement choices. By aggregating these scores, she develops a measure for the degree of convergence 
between a country’s domestic GAAP and IFRS (US GAAP). 
4 Likewise, lobbying activities of managers at the FASB standard setting process demonstrate that 
management typically object to more transparent and restrictive GAAP reforms at the FASB standards 
setting (e.g., Hunton et al. 2004). 
 
 
- 6 -final decision to disclose or withhold information after they have observed the underlying 
events, when they know more about related costs and/or the probability of certain 
outcomes. Managers who wish so can still reveal more than the applicable standards 
require5.  
Next, we also posit that managers choose the standards where they have more 
options to measure a particular item or transition. As documented in Asbaugh and Pincus 
(2001), more volatile earnings are associated with greater analyst forecast errors and a 
negative market reaction (see also Brown (1983) and Elliott and Philbrick (1990)). Having 
more ways available to measure an item or transaction offers the opportunity to disguise 
income volatility, influence contractual outcomes (e.g., management compensation plans) 
and/or manage earnings. The choice to capitalize certain items, for example, offers the 
possibility to smoothly spread the effect of large investments. This idea is in line with a 
prior study by Leuz et al. (2003) and Meuwissen et al. (2004) where systematic 
differences in earnings management across countries (and thus across local GAAP’s) are 
observed. In sum, these considerations result in the following hypothesis: 
 
GENERAL HYPOTHESIS: Firms opt for the set that either allows greater flexibility in 
measurement choices or requires fewer disclosures on relevant accounting topics. 
 
Note that we measure the relevance of the item on which IFRS and US GAAP 
differ, and not what the impact on accounting numbers would be under the two sets. The 
reason why we apply this approach is twofold. First, it is not always possible to measure 
the impact on shareholder equity and company earnings of having other and more 
measurement choices available. Additional and private information is often needed to 
complete a certain accounting treatment. Moreover, even when the difference can be 
calculated in one year (i.e., the year of the initial measurement), it is not clear if and how 
the mean reverting trend of accrual accounting should be taken into consideration. Second, 
the approach taken in this study allows us to include both differences in measurement 
                                                 
5 From the disclosure literature, we know that managers opt for more disclosures when the benefits from 
increased disclosure (i.e. avoiding investors’ rational value discounting) are considerable (e.g., Verrecchia 
1983 and 2001). However, according to a study by Leuz (2003), the capital market does not react differently 




- 7 -choices and differences in disclosure requirements, whereas the other approach clearly 
only considers the first one. 
In testing the general hypothesis, we focus on new economy firms, listed on the 
former6 German New Market (see 3.4). We select three accounting areas that are of 
particular interest to new economy firms. Typically, new economy firms are intensively 
investing in research and development activities (Ittner et al. 2003). Secondly, these firms 
frequently engage in mergers and acquisitions, as it enables them to quickly expand into 
new products and new geographic markets. And thirdly, the importance of stock options 
and other stock-based payments is considerable (Anderson et al. 2000, Murphy 2003). For 
these items, accounting differences between IFRS and US GAAP occur. Following the 
FASB in its comparison project (Bloomer 1999), these differences can be categorized as 
differences in the number of measurement choices (R&D, acquisitions) or differences in 
required disclosures (stock option plans)7 (Ernst&Young 2002). 
 
3.1 DIFFERENCES IN THE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENT CHOICES 
With respect to the R&D expenditures and according to IFRS, firms are required to 
capitalize development costs (provided certain criteria are met), while research costs need 
to be expensed immediately (IAS 38). Under US GAAP, both research and development 
costs need to be expensed in the year they are incurred (FASB Statement 2, see Appendix 
1). In other words, IFRS permits more discretion with regard to the R&D expenditures, 
which can be used for earnings management purposes or to provide information to the 
different stakeholders. By consequence, we hypothesize that it is more likely for firms 
with large R&D expenditures to choose IFRS, since the accounting treatment of R&D is 
more flexible. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
6 The German New Market, or the high-tech and innovative market segment of the Deutsche Börse, was 
closed down on 5th of June 2002. All former companies from the Neuer Markt segment were migrated into 
either the Prime Standard or the General Standard. 
7 The related paragraphs of both IFRS and US GAAP regulation are included in Appendix 1. 
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HYPOTHESISa: Since the accounting treatment of R&D expenditures is more flexible 
and offers more alternatives under IFRS, firms with large R&D expenditures are more 
likely to choose IFRS. 
 
Another area where IFRS and US GAAP differ in the number of measurement 
choices they offer is the area of business combinations (IAS 22 versus APB Opinion 
No.16 and No. 17). Two major differences between IFRS and US GAAP with regard to 
those business combinations exist8. First, the conditions necessary to use the pooling-of-
interest method, as an alternative to the purchase method, are stricter under IFRS. Second, 
the goodwill that arises from applying the purchase method can only be amortized over a 
period not exceeding 20 years, compared to 40 years under US GAAP. Without pooling, 
acquiring other new economy companies means incurring goodwill amounts, resulting in 
reductions of earnings through the amortization of this goodwill. Since the amortization 
period is shorter under IFRS, earnings would be affected more heavily, but during a 
shorter period. Consequently, our hypothesis states that: 
 
HYPOTHESISb: Since the accounting treatment of business combinations is less 
stringent under US GAAP, firms engaging in mergers and acquisitions are more likely 
to choose US GAAP. 
 
3.2 DIFFERENCES IN THE REQUIRED DISCLOSURES 
Next to differences in measurement choices, there are also differences in (the level 
of detail in) the disclosures that are required by IFRS and US GAAP. One such difference 
is with regard to the employee share option plans (Bloomer 1999). IFRS does not require 
nor encourage firms to reflect costs and liabilities in the financial statements (IAS 19). By 
                                                 
8 In 2001, the FASB made two considerable changes to the accounting treatment of business combinations. 
First, all business combinations initiated after June 2001 have to be accounted for using the purchase 
method. Second, the goodwill that arises from these combinations can no longer be amortized but has to be 
tested annually for impairment. Effective June 2001, FAS 141 and 142 thereby supersede APB Opinion 16 
and 17 respectively. Likewise, the IASB published an Exposure Draft on 5 December 2002, proposing to 




- 9 -contrast, US accounting standards do require recognition: at year end, the difference 
between the fair value and option exercise price must be recognized as an expense, and the 
related balance sheet item must be marked on the liability side (FASB Statement No. 123). 
In addition, US GAAP also requires more extensive disclosures. Firms applying US 
GAAP are, for example, required to disclose both the method and significant assumptions 
used to estimate the fair value of options, whereas IFRS has no similar requirements. This 
leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
HYPOTHESISc: Since the accounting treatment of employee share option plans is less 
demanding under IFRS, firms that award option plans to their employees are more 
likely to choose IFRS.  
In the next section, we specify the model that is used to test these hypotheses. 
 
 
4. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
The factors hypothesized as being associated with a firms’ decision to report 
according to IFRS or US GAAP are tested using the following logit regression: 
 
P(US/IFRS)i = α0 + α1 RDi+ α2 ACQi + α3 EMPRIORi + α4 SALESi +  α5 FLOATi + α6 
FOREIGNi + α7 INCSTOCKi + α8 DEBTi + α9 PERFi +α10 INDUSTRYi + εt            (1) 
 
The dependent variable P(US/IFRS) equals 1 if firm i reports US GAAP financial 
statements and zero if a firm reports IFRS financial statements. All variables (unless 
otherwise mentioned) are measured in the year of the switch, as this is most appropriate 
for our research question. Measuring firm characteristics in one particular calendar year 
for all firms could imply that some firms have switched to IFRS/USGAAP years before, 
and that company characteristics have changed in the meantime. Therefore, the year of the 
switch more accurately reflects the firm characteristics that actually lead to IFRS or US 
GAAP preference. 
The three independent variables that are introduced in the model to test the earlier 
developed hypotheses are RD, ACQ and EMPRIOR. The first variable, RD, proxies for 
the annual R&D expenditures of a company (Hypothesisa). The exact annual R&D budget 
cannot be used since firms do not always explicitly mention this amount as a separate line 
 
 
- 10 -item in their reports. Our proxy is defined as the R&D expenses that appear on the P&L 
accounts in year t, plus the newly recorded intangibles during year t minus the new 
goodwill during that year
9. To control for size effects, we furthermore scale by total sales 
during year t
10. As stated in HYPOTHESISa, we expect a negative relation between the R&D 
variable and US GAAP application. With the second variable, ACQ, we measure a firms’ 
engagement in business combinations (HYPOTHESISb). This variable equals one if the 
company has executed an acquisition during year t and 0 otherwise. An acquisition is 
judged to have occurred when either a new acquisition is explicitly mentioned in the notes 
of the annual report or when new goodwill is reported. The latter is mentioned as a 
separate line item in the ‘change in fixed assets’ table in the notes to the financial 
statements. The expected sign on this variable is positive. The last test variable is 
EMPRIOR. This variable reflects whether or not the company gives priority to its 
employees when issuing new equity. Information on this variable is collected from the 
firms’ prospect at the time of the IPO. According to HYPOTHESISc, the existence of 
employee share option plans (EMPRIOR=1) would be negatively associated with US 
GAAP adoption.  
Next to the three test variables, we include a number of control variables identified 
by previous research as influencing the decision to disclose IFRS versus US GAAP 
information. The first five control variables capture investor structure and the demand for 
external information. The first variable is SALES or the natural logarithm of total sales in 
year t: the larger the firm, the higher the incentive to add credibility to the financial 
statements. Given that US GAAP overall requires more extensive disclosures and restricts 
manager’s discretion more, this results in a positive association between SALES and the 
dependent variable
11. A second variable is FLOAT, being the free float of the firm’s 
shares or the percentage of shares that are not held by known shareholders. Similar as for 
the SALES variable, we expect that the larger this percentage, the more dispersed the 
                                                 
9 Although new intangibles other than goodwill still contain more than only capitalised development costs, 
we believe that the measure can be applied in this context. If, hypothetically speaking, intangibles other than 
capitalised development costs would take up a large part of our measure, than still a higher value of the 
measure is expected to be associated with a higher likelihood of applying IFRS. Reason is that revaluations 
of intangible assets are allowed under IFRS (while US GAAP does not offer this opportunity) resulting in 
more management judgment opportunities. 
10 Previous studies have typically used total assets as a measure of size. However, since total assets are 
defined differently under IFRS and US GAAP, total assets would bias the R&D expenditures proxy. 
11 Similar to previous studies, we assume that managers are led by investors’ preference for overall more 
transparent (i.e., more rigorously defined) standards. However, investors might also prefer US standards 




- 11 -ownership, the higher the demand for US GAAP will be
12. The third variable, FOREIGN, 
also looks at the current shareholders, but more at their geographical dispersion. The 
higher the number of (Non-US) foreign equity markets on which a firm is listed, the more 
widespread the current shareholders, the higher the demand for US GAAP information. 
Next, there is INCSTOCK variable. This variable reflects the future change in 
shareholders’ demand for information. The variable equals one if a firm’s common stock 
is increased by 100% in the upcoming year and zero otherwise
13. Since such a change can 
substantially increase the number of shareholders, the demand for information also raises, 
again resulting in a positive relation with the application of US GAAP. Finally, a fifth 
variable is introduced to include the effect of investors other than the shareholders and the 
demand for information by external creditors. This variable is labeled DEBT and defined 
as the long-term debt divided by common stock. Expectations with regard to this variable 
are ambiguous. Some argue that many of the debt holders are ‘insiders’ to the firm, as they 
rely on private rather than public information to make decisions. By consequence, the 
demand for more transparent financial reporting would be lower with higher leverage, 
resulting in a lower association with US GAAP. There are, however, others who argue 
(and find) that debt holders, by closely monitoring the firm, encourage managers to make 
decisions that are more aligned with the interests of stockholders (e.g., Maloney et al. 
1993)
14. Here, more leverage would suggest US GAAP adoption. Given these different 
lines of reasoning, we do not predict the direction of the DEBT variable
15. 
                                                 
12 We acknowledge that there exist different types of shareholders and that composition/diversity of 
shareholders is important in creating incentives for management. For example, the presence of large 
institutional investors or block holders suggests more active monitoring on their behalf (Pound 1988, 
Shleifer and Vishney 1986), thereby limiting managerial discretion on accounting issues (Koh 2003, Kooyul 
and Soo 2002). Other examples are government involvement (Wong et al 2004) and management ownership 
(Ang et al. 2000, Kooyul and Soo 2002). However, since we lack detailed information on shareholder 
structure, we limit the analysis to the percentage of known shareholders (FLOAT). 
13 Most prior studies have used a dummy to reflect whether there was an increase in investor interests or not. 
However, given the nature of our sample firms (i.e. high growth), almost all firms would classify as 
increasing-capital firms (even with relatively small changes in shareholders’ equity). 
14 Debtholders do not necessarily monitor whether management acts in the best interest of shareholders. 
Rather, it is there presence and expertise that leads to managers acting in the best interest of stockholders, as 
suggested by both theoretical (e.g., Jensen 1986) and empirical studies (e.g., Maloney et al. 1993). 
Moreover, especially in Germany, banks often act as trustees in directing the investments of a large 
proportion of individual shareholders. Bank representatives are then often included in supervisory boards 
(Joos and Lang 1994). 
15 Just as with the FLOAT variable, we realize that the diversity might be important: public versus private 
debt, the terms of the debt, the length of the relationship… They all determine the degree to which debt 
holders are stimulated to monitor management decisions or collect other-than financial statement data (e.g., 
Ang et al. 2000; Maloney and Mitchell 1993). However, since there are no better publicly available variables 
that measure these aspects, we use the leverage ratio. 
 
 
- 12 -Finally, two additional variables are included. First, we introduce the variable 
PERF, defined as a firm’s sales margin. Based on findings in the disclosure literature, the 
better performing firms are prepared to disclose more, resulting in a higher likelihood of 
applying US GAAP. With our last control variable, INDUSTRY, we control for industry 
effects, acknowledging that firms’ standard choice might be influenced by the behavior of 
other companies in the same industry. Since most of the world’s leading companies in the 
non-traditional sectors are US-based and given that comparability between firms in the 
same sector is desirable, firms in the non-traditional sectors are more likely to apply US 
standards. As non-traditional sectors we consider the telecom sector, IT, software, internet, 
medical technology and biotech while industry and manufacturing are more traditional 
sectors. 
Unlike prior studies, we did not include any country level variables (e.g. degree of 
convergence between local and international GAAP). Reason is that 88% of our sample is 
Germany-based, resulting in too little variation in a country variable to run statistically 
sound regressions
16. An overview of all these variables is given in Table 1. 
 




P(US/IFRS)  = probability of using US GAAP (1) versus IFRS (0)
Explanatory Test Variabales
RD  = (expensed R&Dt + new intangiblest - new goodwillt)/total salest -
ACQ  = 1 if an acquisition occurred during year t; 0 otherwise +
EMPRIOR  = 1 if employees have share priority rights at the time of IPO -
Explanatory Control Variables
SALES  = natural logarithm of total salest +
FLOAT  = 100 - percentage of shares held by known shareholders at time of IPO +
FOREIGN  = 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a foreign equity market; 0 otherwise +
INCSTOCK  = 1 if common stock doubles between year t and year t+1 +
DEBT  = total long-term debtt / common equityt ?
PERF  = net operating profitt / total salest +
INDUSTRY  = 1 if activities are either telecom, IT, software, internet, medical technology 




                                                 
16 Untabulated multivariate results where we make a distinction between (1) German and non-German 
companies and (2) between code and common law countries, show that there is no significant influence of 




- 13 -5. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
To test the hypotheses, we compose a sample of companies listed on the German 
New Market (see Table 2). Listing requirements on this market demand firms to either 
follow IFRS or US GAAP. Since the application of local standards is not allowed, our 
results on the IFRS/ US GAAP choice determinants are not distorted by selection bias.  
In selecting the sample companies, we rely on IPO information provided on the 
New Market website. We first select all firms that are first time listed on this market either 
in 1997, 1998 or 1999. We limit ourselves to this period, since relatively few amendments 
or changes are made to either set of standards during the period 1997-2000
17. Then, we 
collect data on these firms using two sources: (1) the Worldscope database for obtaining 
financial data and (2) hardcopy versions of the firm’s prospect
18 and annual reports, to 
complement the financial data with more qualitative or descriptive data. Of the 183 IPO’s, 
there are 27 companies for which there are no data available whatsoever and 12 firms for 
which we aren’t able to obtain a hardcopy annual report. Due to incomplete financial data, 
we further delete 7 firms and additionally, we exclude two companies from our sample 
because they are active in the financial sector.  
For the remaining 135 companies, we scan the hardcopy annual reports in the years 
surrounding the IPO to determine both the actual set of international standards and the 
first year of application. Firms are classified as IFRS (US GAAP) firms if they declare 
their statements in conformity with IFRS (US GAAP) in the summary of accounting 
policies in their notes and/or if the auditor states in his report that the accounts are IFRS 
(US GAAP) compliant. We determine the year of the switch since this will be the basis for 
collecting and comparing firms’ accounting and financial data.  
From the 135 firms, 14 companies are deleted because we are unclear about the 
accounting standards being used. Ten other companies continue to report under local 
GAAP, be it with a reconciliation or transition (of both net income and shareholders’ 
equity) to an international set. To avoid a mix up of both locally and non-locally stated 
data, we delete these 10 firms. Finally, we also exclude 3 companies that are cross-listed 
                                                 
17 The IASB initiated an improvements project in that period. However, the standards that were newly issued 
or changed because of the project only became effective on the 1
st of January 2001, meaning that they 
should be applied to annual periods beginning on or after 1
st of January 2001. 
18 Two variables (being EMPRIOR and FLOAT) are measured using prospect information. Reason is that 
financial statements might provide incomplete or biased representation of the respective item. 
 
 
- 14 -on Nasdaq or New York Stock Exchange because of the specific characteristics of locally 
reported accounting information of U.S. cross-listed firms (Lang et al. 2003). In the end, 
the final sample consists of 108 companies
19. 
 
TABLE 2: SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE (STUDY 2) 
183 IPO's by the end of 1999
REASON FOR DELETION
 -2 7 no Worldscope data and no hardcopy of annual report
 -1 2 no hardcopy of the annual report
 -7incomplete financial data
 -2companies active in the financial sector
 -1 4 unknown date of first-time IFRS/US GAAP application
 -1 0 applying local GAAP






6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
The results show that 41% or 44 sample firms apply US GAAP while 64 
companies choose to adopt IFRS. For a large majority of firms, the year of the switch 
coincides with the year of IPO. Notwithstanding the market requirements to apply IFRS or 
US GAAP from the IPO onwards, some firms seem to delay their first time application of 
non-local standards with one or two years (see Table 3). The length of that delay is 
moreover not significantly different for IFRS and US GAAP (Wilcoxon p-value of 0.37). 
                                                 
19 Following the new segmentation of the Deutsche Börse, these sample firms were listed on either the 
Prime or the General Standard starting June 2003. Based on March 2004 data, we conclude that 69 went 
onto the Prime Standard, while 36 remained on the General Standard. The six other sample firms either went 
bankrupt or merged in the meantime.
 
 
- 15 -TABLE 3: COMPANIES’ FIRST TIME APPLICATION OF IFRS OR US GAAP VERSUS  
THE YEAR OF IPO 
Year of the IPO 1997 1998 1999 2000
1997 2 1 2 -
1998 - 19 9 -
1999 - 7 53 15
First-time application of IFRS or US GAAP
 
Firms are on average 13 years old when they make the switch from local GAAP to 
IFRS or US GAAP. Almost half of the sample firms are even younger then 10 years at the 
time of the switch, while only 5 firms are more than 30 years old. As can be expected, 
given the geographical location of the market, the vast majority of our sample firms (88%) 
are incorporated in Germany. The remaining firms are either from Austria (7), Israel (3), 
the Netherlands (2) or Switzerland (1). Next to being listed on the German New Market, 
there are some firms that are cross-listed on other markets. These markets are Nasdaq 
Europe, Buda Stock Exchange or the U.S. over-the-counter Market
20. The activities in 
which the sample firms operate range from internet, software and IT over medtech, 
biotech and telecom to technology, media and industry (see Table 4).  
 
TABLE 4: SAMPLE COMPOSITION WITH REGARD TO COMPANY ACTIVITIES 
Absolute Percentage




Medical Technology 3 2.78%
Internet 15 13.89%
Information Technology 17 15.74%
Software 18 16.67%
Telecom 6 5.56%
total sample 108 100.00%
                                                 
20 OTC firms trade in the U.S., but face a different regulatory environment (Lang et al. 2003). In particular, 
OTC firms do not need to edit reconciliations to U.S. GAAP and they also do not face increased 
enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
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Before discussing the univariate results, we first provide a number of descriptives 
for the entire sample in Table 5. First, we find that the three items selected to investigate 
the impact of accounting differences are highly relevant to our sample firms. Two thirds of 
the sample firms engage in business combinations, 67% assign employee stock options 
and, on average 22% of annual sales is invested in research and development activities. 
Second, we conclude that, although the equity market is addressed to attract (FOREIGN= 
0.18) and increase capital (INCSTOCKMEAN= 0.19), debt financing is still considerable. 
Twenty-five percent of the sample firms have almost as much long-term debt as common 
equity capital (DEBTQ3=0.97). This is not surprising, given that 88% of our sample firms 
are incorporated in Germany, where firms typically rely heavily on bank financing (Joos 
and Lang 1994). Finally, we also observe that more than half of the companies are active 
in non-traditional industries (INDUSTRYQ2=1) and typically sell their products or services 
at a loss (PERFMEAN = -0.14). 
 
TABLE 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON CHOICE MODEL VARIABLES 
MEAN ST DEV Q1 Q2 Q3
RD 0.2164 0.5167 0.0077 0.0408 0.1305
ACQ 0.7500 0.4350 0.5 1 1
EMPRIOR 0.6667 0.4736 0 1 1
PPEQ 0.1098 0.1179 0.0227 0.0601 0.1584
SALES 10.3574 1.1954 9.5789 10.2406 11.2042
FLOAT 51.9692 18.9866 37.1250 49.6000 64.8000
FOREIGN 0.1759 0.3825 0 0 0
INCSTOCK 0.1852 0.3902 0 0 0
DEBT 7.7646 57.2698 0 0.0925 0.9711
PERF  -0.1379 0.6807 -0.1007 0.0229 0.1004





- 17 -Results from the univariate tests are presented in Table 6. Non-parametric Mann-
Whitney tests
21 are performed on the continuous variables, while the dichotomous 
variables are tested using a χ²-test. On average, we find that IFRS firms (1) spend 
significantly more on research and development activities (RD, p=.07) and (2) are less 
frequently quoted on foreign equity markets (FOREIGN, p=.01) compared to US GAAP 
firms. Furthermore, we also see that relatively more IFRS firms award their employees 
with share priority rights (EMPRIOR, p=.07) and engage in large equity offerings 
(INCSTOCK, p=.04) as opposed to firms applying US GAAP. Finally, the results also 
show a choice difference between industries (INDUSTRY, p=.05) where firms that are 
characterized as non-traditional more frequently choose for US GAAP compared to more 
traditional firms. No significant differences are found between the two groups with regard 
to their engagement in acquisitions, size, percentage of unknown shareholders, debt 
structure and performance (respectively ACQ, SALES, FLOAT, DEBT, PERF). 
 
                                                 
21 Non-parametric tests are performed instead of parametric t-tests since the variables are not normally 
distributed within the IFRS and/or US GAAP group. 
 
 
- 18 -TABLE 6: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF IFRS VERSUS US GAAP FIRMS 
IFRS firms US GAAP firms Mann-Whitney U-test Chi-square test
RD µ = 0.2371 µ = 0.1862 Z = 1.4914 NA
σ = 0.58 σ = 0.41 (p = 0.07*)
ACQ µ = 0.7031 µ =  0.8182 NA χ ²= 1.8409
σ = 0.46 σ = 0.40 (p = 0.17)
EMPRIOR µ = 0.7344 µ = 0.5682 NA χ ²= 3.2408
σ = 0.45 σ = 0.50 (p = 0.07*)
SALES µ = 10.4826 µ = 10.1752 Z = -0.991 NA
σ = 1.16 σ = 1.24 (p = 0.16)
FLOAT µ = 49.9905 µ = 54.8473 Z = 1.0161 NA
σ = 16.68 σ = 21.80 (p = 0.15)
FOREIGN µ = 0.1094 µ = 0.2727 Z = 2.1758 NA
σ = 0.31 σ = 0.45 (p = 0.01**)
INCSTOCK µ = 0.2500 µ = 0.0909 NA χ ²= 4.3736
σ = 0.44 σ =  0.29 (p = 0.04**)
DEBT µ = 0.6332 µ = 18.1375 Z = 0.4461 NA
σ = 1.14 σ = 89.30 (p = 0.66)
PERF  µ = −0.0481 µ = −0.2685 Z = -0.2970 NA
σ = 0.41 σ = 0.94 (p = 0.38)
INDUSTRY µ = 0.5156 µ = 0.7045 NA χ ²= 3.8546
σ = 0.50 σ = 0.46 (p = 0.05*)
NA: Not Appropriate
*,** = p-value <.10, .05 respectively
 
6.2  M ULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
Results from applying the model specified in section 4 are shown in Table 7 (see 
model 1). Overall, the model is highly significant with a χ-square of 35.48  (p<0.0001), a 
pseudo R-square of 32,10% and 80% of the observations correctly classified. Furthermore, 
we find evidence to support all three hypotheses. The first hypothesis, relating choice to 
the annual R&D expenditures, is significant at 8%-level and results in a negative 
coefficient: the higher the R&D budget, the less likely that US GAAP is being applied. 
The fact that development costs may be capitalized under IFRS, and not according to 
others, indeed has an impact on the standards choice for firms with high R&D 
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expenditures. Evidence for the second hypothesis is less strong, but still significant at 
10%-level (with a p-value of 0.0911). The positive parameter on ACQ indicates that firms 
engaging in acquisitions are more frequently associated with US GAAP compliance than 
with IFRS. Since US GAAP offers the opportunity to account for acquisitions in a way 
where earnings are less affected in the short run, this confirms HYPOTHESISb. Finally, also 
the last hypothesis with regard to employee share option plans is confirmed (EMPRIOR= -
1.0048). Firms that award their employees with share option plans will more likely apply 
IFRS, or the standard that requires less disclosures on this item (p=0.0583).  
With regard to the control variables, we find results consistent with previous 
research for foreign equity listings (FOREIGN): being listed on a Non-US, foreign equity 
market is associated with a higher probability of applying US GAAP (FOREIGN = 
1.7912, p=0.0131). Contrary to previous research, we find a negative effect of stock 
increases (INCSTOCK=-2.2339, p=0.0047). This negative association could be due to the 
fact that the sample companies are European based and that raising capital mainly happens 
on European markets. Unlike other studies, we also find significant results for the 
INDUSTRY variable (p=0.0506). Companies that operate in the high-tech sectors, are 
more likely to apply US GAAP (INDUSTRY=1.0645).  
In Table 7, we also present model 2, where the variables that relate to specific 
accounting differences are excluded. Compared to this reduced model, results from model 
1 clearly indicate that specific accounting differences do have an (incremental) impact on 
the standard regime choice. The model’s pseudo R-square increases from 20% to 32% by 





TABLE 7: MULTIVARIATE RESULTS OF THE CHOICE MODEL 
 














INTERCEPT -1.5137 2.7196 0.3098 0.5778 -2.2810 2.5044 0.8295 0.3624
RD -1.0774 0.6122 3.0970 0.0784 *
ACQ 0.9871 0.5842 2.8548 0.0911 *
EMPRIOR -1.0048 0.5306 3.5859 0.0583 *
SALES -0.0625 0.2318 0.0726 0.7876 0.0221 0.2150 0.0105 0.9182
FLOAT 0.0203 0.0128 2.5383 0.1111 0.0179 0.0120 2.2098 0.1371
FOREIGN 1.7912 0.7219 6.1565 0.0131 ** 1.0875 0.5940 3.3526 0.0671 **
INCSTOCK -2.2339 0.7897 8.0012 0.0047 ** -1.7734 0.7240 5.9991 0.0143 **
PERF -0.6233 0.5889 1.1205 0.2898 -0.2631 0.3620 0.5281 0.4674
DEBT 0.1210 0.1439 0.7077 0.4002 0.1625 0.1269 1.6396 0.2004
INDUSTRY 1.0645 0.5445 3.8221 0.0506 * 0.9551 0.4927 3.7574 0.0526 *
Model χ² 35.48 ** Model χ² 24.52 **
Pseudo-R² 0.32 Pseudo-R² 0.20
Concordant 80.0% Concordant 74.1%
The dependent variable, P(US/IFRS), equals 1 if US GAAP are applied, 0 if IFRS are applied. Independent variables are defined in Table 3.1.
*,** = p-value <.10, .05 respectively









 In testing the robustness of our findings, we alternatively define a number of 
variables. For example, we expand the acquisition window to two years since it might be 
argued that plans for future acquisitions are not fully captured within a one-year window. 
This variable is labeled ACQLT. We also replace the INCSTOCK dummy by the DSTOCK 
dummy, where the variable takes 1 if there is an increase in common stock and 0 if not. 
The debt structure is alternatively proxied by the percentage of short-term debt (with 
common stock as denominator; STDEBT) and the firms’ industry is measured applying a 
more traditional industry variable (MANUFACT), distinguishing between manufacturing 
and service companies. Finally, we measure performance by the operational cash flow 
scaled by total sales (CASHFLOW).  
Overall, and as documented in Appendix 2, all models (3 to 7) outperform the 
reduced model, model 2, where no specific accounting differences are taken into account. 
The percentage of firms classified correctly by these models ranges from .77 to .80. 
Except for small changes in the significance levels, the evidence remains consistent with 
our hypotheses and the sign of the coefficients stays constant. 
Note, however, that the alternative acquisitions variable (ACQLT) results in a 
positive but insignificant parameter estimate (ACQLT= 0.6210, p=0.3242). This might be 
caused by the public debate regarding the appropriateness of the pooling method (under 
US GAAP) that was going on during our sample period. The FASB issued an exposure 
draft suggesting to eliminate pooling for all business combinations in 1999 (Bloomer, 
1999). The decision to eliminate the pooling method became effective only in 2001. Since 
most of our sample firms switch to an international GAAP in that period (59 % in 1999, 
see Table 3), it is reasonable to expect that firms anticipate this development, and, by 
consequence, that this difference between IFRS and US GAAP is no longer relevant. This 
argument is supported by the fact that the acquisition variable becomes even less 
significant when the two-year acquisition window is applied (going from p=0.0911 to 
p=0.3242).  
Finally, the insignificant effect we obtain on the alternative industry variable 
(MANUFACT=-0.5548, p=0.2920) seems to suggest that a manufacturing / services 
distinction is irrelevant in this context, whereas the high-tech/ low-tech difference does 
impact standard choice. 
 
 
- 22 -6.3 EXTENSIONS 
Two questions remain unanswered in the basic model. First, is it fair to say that 
accounting differences influence standard choice only when the involved item or 
transaction is relevant or are accounting differences on irrelevant items also important? 
Secondly, does a firm with more than one relevant accounting difference in favor of IFRS 
have a greater incentive to apply IFRS than a firm with only one? And what about firms 
that simultaneously have an incentive to choose US GAAP, for example because they are 
frequently involved in acquisitions?  
First, we elaborate on the relevance aspect of the selected items. In our general 
hypothesis we state that firms opt for the set that either allows greater flexibility in 
measurement choices or requires fewer disclosures on relevant accounting topics. From 
the descriptives in section , we already learned that the items we selected, and on which 
IFRS and US GAAP differ, are important to our sample firms. However, our tests in the 
multivariate section would be more convincing when we added a new item on which IFRS 
and US GAAP also differ, but which in itself might be less relevant for our sample firms 
and thus less decisive in choosing a standards set. Therefore, we include a variable 
capturing the firm’s investment in property, plant and equipment. Descriptives show that, 
on average, this item compromises only 11% of the balance sheet total (see Table 5). 
In general, both IFRS and US GAAP require items of property, plant and 
equipment to be carried at its cost less any accumulated depreciation and any accumulated 
impairment losses. But besides this benchmark treatment, IFRS also allows firms to 
measure the item at a revalued amount, being its fair value at the date of the revaluation 
less any subsequent depreciation and amortizations. Since IFRS offers more discretion to 
management and revaluations improve the balance sheet (by increasing the firms’ equity 
base), we would expect firms with a lot of tangible assets to choose for IFRS. The variable 
is measured as the gross amount (i.e., irrespective of the subsequent measurement) of 
property plant and equipment in the year of the switch, scaled by total sales in that year 
(PPEQ). The following model is estimated: 
 
P(US/IFRS) = α0 + α1 RD + α2 ACQ + α3 EMPRIOR +α4 PPEQ+ α5 SALES +  α6 FLOAT 
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The results from rerunning model 1 with the additional test variable PPEQ are 
presented in Table 8. No significant changes are made to the model, as the number of 
observations classified correctly by this model is similar as in model 1 (Concordant=80%) 
and our three test variables remain significant (p=0.0715, p=0.0979 and p=0.0673 
respectively). The coefficient of PPEQ is however insignificant (p=0.35), suggesting that 
this item does not have a decisive influence on the IFRS/US GAAP choice. 
 
 
TABLE 8: MULTIVARIATE RESULTS OF THE CHOICE MODEL, INCLUDING A PROPERTY, 












INTERCEPT -1.5033 2.7848 0.2914 0.5893
RD -1.2035 0.6678 3.2484 0.0715 *
ACQ 0.9736 0.5882 2.7392 0.0979 *
EMPRIOR -1.0057 0.5497 3.3474 0.0673 *
PPEQ 0.5816 0.6257 0.8640 0.3526
SALES -0.0742 0.2355 0.0993 0.7527
FLOAT 0.0213 0.0134 2.5468 0.1105
FOREIGN 1.6744 0.7355 5.1834 0.0228 **
INCSTOCK -2.2126 0.7852 7.9400 0.0048 **
PERF -0.5284 0.6068 0.7583 0.3839
DEBT 0.0863 0.1211 0.5080 0.4760
INDUSTRY 1.0833 0.5537 3.8277 0.0504 *
Model χ² 33.44 **
Pseudo-R² 0.32
Concordant 79.8%
*,** = p-value <.10, .05 respectively
P(US/IFRS) = α0 + α1 RD + α2 ACQ + α3 EMPRIOR +α4 PPEQ+ α5 SALES +  α6 FLOAT 
+ α7 FOREIGN + α8 INCSTOCK + α9 DEBT + α10 PERF +α11 INDUSTRY
The dependent variable, P(US/IFRS), equals 1 if US GAAP are applied, 0 if IFRS are 
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model was specified as a linear, additive model, thereby assuming that the effect of for 
example engaging in acquisitions is constant over the whole range of the R&D intensity. It 
might however be reasonable to expect that there is a cumulative and/or trade-off effect 
between these variables. A firm that invests in R&D and rewards its employees with share 
options can be expected to have a larger incentive to apply IFRS than a firm that only 
engages in R&D activities. In accommodating for any interaction effects, we first redefine 
the ACQ-test variables so that higher values of this variable are expected to be associated 
with IFRS GAAP adoption (as is the case for the other test variables). Following, we run a 
full rank interactive model: 
 
P(US/IFRS) = α0 + α1 RD  + α2 RACQ + α3 EMPRIOR + α4 RD*RACQ + α5 
RD*EMPRIOR + α6 RACQ*EMPRIOR + α7 RD*RACQ*EMPRIOR + α8 SALES + α9 
FLOAT + α10 FOREIGN + α11 INCSTOCK + α12 DEBT + α13 PERF +α14 INDUSTRY   
                              ( 9 )  
 
With RACQ equaling 1 when the firm is not engaged in mergers and acquisitions (0 
otherwise). All other variables are as defined in Table 1. 
 
 
As the results in Table 9 show, we find no direct evidence of any interactive 
effects
22. Looking at the degree of correlation between the three variables (see Appendix 
3), firms are typically confronted with only one of the items at a time, eliminating any 
opposing or mutually reinforcing incentives. 
 
                                                 
22 Alternatively, we also performed a median split on the RD variable (median= 0.0408, see Table 2.5). The 
model is however not reported since it suffers from quasi-complete separation of data-points. 
 
 








INTERCEPT -0.7073 2.7577 0.0658 0.7976
RD -2.7723 1.8988 2.1317 0.1443
RACQ -2.0626 1.2999 2.5178 0.1126
EMPRIOR -1.4051 0.6991 4.0399 0.0444 **
RD*RACQ 25.7678 51.5140 0.2502 0.6169
RD*EMPRIOR 1.6348 2.2190 0.5427 0.4613
RACQ*EMPRIOR 0.9592 1.5388 0.3886 0.5331
RD*RACQ*EMPRIOR -24.9457 51.4713 0.2349 0.6279
SALES -0.0096 0.2396 0.0016 0.9681
FLOAT 0.0205 0.0131 2.4580 0.1169
FOREIGN 1.6232 0.7708 4.4344 0.0352 **
INCSTOCK -2.2381 0.8002 7.8219 0.0052 **
PERF -0.5858 0.6001 0.9531 0.3289
DEBT 0.1430 0.1574 0.8260 0.3634
INDUSTRY 1.0695 0.5686 3.5380 0.0600 *
Model χ² 38.99 **
Pseudo-R² 0.36
Concordant 81.4 %
*,** = p-value <.10, .05 respectively
P(US/IFRS) = α0 + α1 RD + α2 RACQ + α3 EMPRIOR + α4 RD*ACQ + α5 RD*EMPRIOR 
+ α6 ACQ*EMPRIOR + α7 RD*ACQ*EMPRIOR + α8 SALES +  α9 FLOAT + α10 
FOREIGN + α11 INCSTOCK + α12 DEBT + α13 PERF +α14 INDUSTRY
The dependent variable, P(US/IFRS), equals 1 if US GAAP are applied, 0 if IFRS are 
applied. Independent variables are defined in Table 2.1.
 
 
7. FLEXIBILITY: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? 
 
One of the major conclusions from the previous section is that firms choose the 
standard set that offers them the most flexibility on relevant accounting issues. 
Nonetheless, an important question remains, namely how is earnings affected by offering 
firms this flexibility. For example, does the flexibility make the reported earnings number 
more value relevant? In order to examine the impact on earnings, we study two earnings 
attributes: predictability and value relevance. In particular, we investigate whether 
 
 
- 26 -flexibility in financial statement reporting results in (a) users better predicting future cash 
flows and (b) information that better reflects underlying firm value. 
While the valuation question can be investigated for all three accounting items 
discussed in section 3, the question on predictability cannot. Reason is that the link with 
future performance is not clear for all three accounting items: only a direct link between 
the R&D and future performance has been documented to exist (Aboody and Lev, 1999). 
For goodwill and employee benefit disclosures, this link is far less obvious. Both 
questions will therefore be examined by addressing only the R&D recognition. More 
specifically, our two questions are: (a) does the practiced R&D capitalization provide any 
additional information about future performance and (b) does the capitalized R&D amount 
contain value relevant information? Since flexibility on this item is only offered under 
IFRS (whereas US GAAP requires immediate expensing), and we are interested in the 
effective use of that flexibility, we consider only the IFRS subsample in this section. 
 
TABLE 10: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON R&D TREATMENT 





Total R&D ('000 €) 156,529 4,759 0.95
Total R&D / Sales 0.25 0.14 0.76
Goodwill amortization period 
(years) 12.32 9.77 0.02





firms with no new R&D
firms with capitalized R&D




Of the 108 companies included in the sample, 64 apply IFRS and consequently 
have the possibility to capitalize development costs. From Table 10, we conclude that 
capitalization of R&D expenditures is commonly applied: 32 of the 64 IFRS companies 
either partly or fully capitalize their development costs (see Panel B). 
 
 














                                                 
7.1 PREDICTABILITY OF EARNINGS 
To investigate whether the flexibility helps users to better predict future 
performance, we regress future performance on current year accounting information. In 
particular, we run a first-order autoregressive model (e.g., Lipe 1990) where next period’s 
earnings (scaled by total sales) are the dependent variable and current year’s earnings (also 
scaled by total sales) are included as independent variable
23. In a first model, we restate 
earnings to be on an as-if expense basis (X t ). In a second model, we additionally 
introduce the change in earnings when capitalization is allowed (measured as the 
difference between X t  and X t ) as a second explanatory variable. The models look as 
follows: 
 
OCFi,t+1 = α0 + α1 X  + εt                       (10) 
OCFi,t+1 = α0 + α1 X  it  + α2 (X  – X ) + εt                          (11) 
 
where the models’ R-square captures the predictive ability of current accounting 
information (see Van der Meulen et al. 2005). Given that capitalization under IFRS is only 
allowed when benefits are probable to flow to the enterprise, we expect model 11 to result 
in better predictions of future firm performance
24. 
Results from estimating these two models are presented in Panel A in Table 11. 
We find that including the (X  – X ) term results in a significant parameter on this 
variable and in an adjusted R
C
2 of 11%. The reduced model, model 10, is associated with an 
adjusted R
2 of only 6%. Further tests (Vuong 1989, Dechow 1994) on the models’ R
2 
however suggest that the difference is not significant (Z-statistic= -0.99). In other words, 
although there is some indication of increased predictive ability, we cannot statistically 
conclude that flexibility better informs investors about future performance. 
23 Note that next period’s earnings have also been restated to adjust for the annual amortization effect (of this 
year’s capitalised R&D). Based on hardcopy data concerning R&D capitalisation and amortization period, 
we were able to estimate this annual amortization expense. Alternatively, we ran the analysis without 
amortization correction and obtained very similar results.  
24 Preliminary analyses of model 12 show that there is significant multicollinearity among the right hand side 
variables. For parameter estimation purposes, multicollinearity must be taken into consideration, however, 
for prediction purposes, multicollinearity typically has little impact (Verbeek 2000). This approach is similar 
to the one taken in Wysocki (2004).  
 TABLE 11: MULTIVARIATE RESULTS ON THE PREDICTABILITY AND VALUE RELEVANCE OF IFRS STATED EARNINGS 









t Value p > |t|
  INTERCEPT -0.2049 0.0457 -4.49 <.0001** -0.2013 0.0465 -4.33 <.0001**
  EARNt
E 0.2096 0.0791 2.65 0.0103** 0.1026 0.0546 1.88 0.0649*
  EARNt
C – EARNt
E  0.2146 0.1169 1.84 0.0714*
Model R² 0.11 (Pr>F = 3.52) Model R² 0.06 (Pr>F =3.54)
Adj R² 7.64 Adj R² 0.04









t Value p > |t|
  INTERCEPT -0.4777 0.0730 -6.5400 <.0001** -0.4965 0.0737 -6.7400 <.0001**
  EPS
E





it 2.6715 1.4473 1.8500 0.0699*
Model R² 0.10 (Pr>F = 0.04) Model R² 0.05 (Pr>F = 0.07)
Adj R² 0.07 Adj R² 0.04









t Value p > |t|
 INTERCEPT 13.4535 1.3645 9.8593 <.0001** 12.6293 1.3971 9.0400 <.0001**
  EPS
E





it 1.6408 0.6290 2.6085 0.0115**
Model R² 0.10 (Pr>F = 0.05) Model R² 0.02 (Pr>F = 0.25)
Adj R² 0.07 Adj R² 0.01
*,** = p-value <.10, .05 respectively
Pit = γ0 + γ 1 X
E




it) + φit Pit = γ0 + γ 1 X
E
it + φit
Note. To control for general market tendencies and price evolutions, we used year 2000 accounting data for all our firms (instead of the year of first time application).
Xi,t+1 = α0 + α1 Xi,t
E + εt Xi,t+1 = α0 + α1 Xi,t
E + α2 (Xit
C – Xit
E ) + εt
RETit = β 0 + β 1 X
E














7.2 VALUE RELEVANCE OF EARNINGS 
Next to the predictive ability of R&D capitalization, we also look at the value 
relevance of R&D capitalization. To examine this, we estimate both price and return 
models. As suggested by Kothari and Zimmerman (1995), estimating both has the 
potential to yield more convincing evidence. Results should then indicate whether the 
information that is additionally provided by offering more reporting flexibility is value 
relevant or not. In testing this value-relevance, we use similar techniques as Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996). For a large sample of R&D expensers, Lev and Sougiannis estimate 
the R&D capital by applying a sector specific amortization rate. They then adjust the 
reported earnings and book values for the R&D capitalization and introduce them in 
traditional return and price models, where they find that such adjustments are indeed 
value-relevant to investors. Our approach differs from that of Lev and Sougiannis in that 
we start from firms’ actual R&D capitalization rates and use this information to restate 
reported earnings to be on an as-if expense basis. Moreover, since the information on 
R&D capitalization is actually observed by investors, an association with prices/returns 
indicates that the information is value-relevant (and not that capitalization has the 
potential to be value-relevant, like in Lev and Sougiannis). The models are of the form: 
 
RETit = β 0 + β 1 X
E




it)/Pi,t-1 + νit     ( 1 2 )  
Pit = γ0 + γ 1 X
E




it) + φit       ( 1 3 )  
 
where RETit is the annual stock return starting nine months before fiscal t year-end 




it are respectively reported and adjusted (or expensed) 
earnings-per-share (before extraordinary items) and Pit is the share price of firm i at the 
end of the period. 
In the above-mentioned models, stock returns (respectively share prices) are 
regressed on the level of earnings
25. The adjustment to earnings, as-if all development 





Both models are run on a contemporaneous basis, thereby indicating the extent of current 
                                                 
25 Both right-hand side earnings variables in model 12 are deflated by the firm’s share price at the beginning 
of the fiscal year. In model 13, there is no price deflation. Therefore, we apply White’s correction for 
heteroscedasticity. 
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recognition of accounting numbers by investors. Since development costs may only be 
recognized as an asset “when it is probable that the future economic benefits will flow to 
the enterprise” (IASB Framework §89), we expect that the capitalization adjustment is 
positively correlated with stock prices and returns. 
In Table 12, Panel B and C, we present the results of the estimated models. 





it), is positive (β2= 2.6715) and significant (p= 0.0699). In other 
words, information on R&D capitalization represents information that is relevant to 
investors in valuing a firm. That accounting data overall become more value relevant by 
adding information on capitalization, is also documented by comparing the R-squares of 
the reduced (with only expensed earnings per share) and full model (with both the 
expensed earnings and the capitalization adjustment). For the return models, this results 
in: 
 
RETit = β 0 + β 1 X
E
it/Pi,t-1+ νit  
RETit = β 0 + β 1 X
E




it)/Pi,t-1+ νit  
 
As presented in column two of Table 14, the Adjusted R-square of the full model 
is higher than that of the reduced model (.07 compared to .04). Performing a Vuong test 
on the observed R-squares further results in a Z-statistic of respectively –3.383 and –
1.349. Similar results are obtained for the price/earnings model. In sum, offering 
flexibility on R&D does seem to result in more value relevant information. 
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8. SUMMARY 
 
Due to the increased competition on capital markets, a big number of markets and 
countries are currently offering firms the opportunity to depart from local standards and 
choose a different set of standards. As evidenced by previous findings, firms do not 
randomly pick their set of standards. Instead, the decision is well thought through, 
considering possible costs and benefits to the firm. Implementing new standards, for 
example, requires training of personnel, an adequate management information system… 
Possible benefits can be increased comparability and visibility and thereby, a lower cost of 
capital.  
Relatively little attention has however been paid to specific differences between 
sets of standards. In this study, we addressed this void: we argued that if a transaction 
frequently occurs within a company and that transaction is treated differently under two 
sets of standards, this difference might influence the firm’s standard set choice. The main 
proposition on which this study is based is that accounting differences between standards 
only matter in the standard choice when these differences are relevant to the firm. 
Therefore, we compare IFRS and US GAAP, 2 sets of standards that might be comparable 
in many respects, but still differ in accounting for some transactions.  
Accordingly, we select three issues on which they differ and which are possibly 
relevant to our sample firms. A first difference is with regard to R&D expenditures. As 
IFRS offers the possibility to capitalize development costs, while US GAAP requires 
immediate expensing, we hypothesize that R&D intensive companies will opt for IFRS. 
Second area of interest is the area of business combinations. Given that US GAAP offers 
more flexibility on this issue, undertaking an acquisition is believed to be associated with 
US GAAP application. A third difference is with regard to employee share option plans, 
an item on which US GAAP is overall more demanding. Following the same reasoning, 
we hypothesize a negative relation between firms that award their employees with options 
and US GAAP choice. The results provide evidence consistent with our hypotheses: 
managers indeed opt for the standards set that provides most flexibility and demands least 
disclosures. Furthermore, we also found that offering firms more flexibility does not 
necessarily mean they use it. However, when taking advantage of the flexibility, it is used 
for the benefit of the investors, as it increases the value relevance of the accounting 
numbers. 
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Our results are nonetheless subject to the following caveats. First, we address a 
very specific market of young and innovative firms. These new economy firms differ 
however in many respects from old economy firms and hence, it is not clear whether the 
results extend to the more mature firms in traditional industries. Secondly, we did not 
include all differences. As documented in the extensions section, the accounting item on 
which IFRS and US GAAP differ must be relevant to the firm. When addressing a 
different sample, other differences might therefore be more relevant.  
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APPENDIX 1: RELEVANT IFRS/US GAAP PASSAGES 
 
Research and Development 
IAS 38 
§42: No intangible asset arising from research (or from the research phase of an internal project) should be 
recognized. Expenditure on research (or on the research phase of an internal project) should be recognized as 
an expense when it is incurred. 
§43: This standard takes the view that, in the research phase of a project, an enterprise cannot demonstrate 
that an intangible asset exists that will generate probable future economic benefits. Therefore, this 
expenditure is always recognized as an expense when it is incurred. 
 
IAS 38- §45: An intangible asset arising from development (or from the development phase of an internal 
project) should be recognized if, and only if, an enterprise can demonstrate all of the following: 
(a)  the technical feasibility of completing the intangible asset so that it will be available for use or sale; 
(b)  its intention to complete the intangible asset and use or sell it; 
(c)  its ability to use or sell the intangible asset; 
(d)  how the intangible asset will generate probable future economic benefits. Among other things, the 
enterprise should demonstrate that the existence of a market for the output of the intangible asset or the 
intangible asset itself or, if it is to be used internally, the usefulness of the intangible asset; 
(e)  the availability to measure the expenditure attributable to the intangible asset during its 
development reliability. 
§46: In the development phase of a project, an enterprise can, in some instances, identify an intangible asset 
and demonstrate that the asset will generate probable future economic benefits. This is because the 
development phase of a project is further advanced than the research phase. 
§48: To demonstrate how an intangible asset will generate probable future economic benefits, an enterprise 
assesses the future economic benefits to be received from the asset using the principles in IAS 36, 
Impairment of Assets. If the asset will generate economic benefits only in combination with other assets, the 
enterprise applies the concept of cash generating units set out in IAS 36. 
§49: Availability of resources to complete, use and obtain the benefits from an intangible asset can be 
demonstrated by, for example, a business plan showing the technical, financial and other resources needed 
and the enterprise’s ability to secure those resources. In certain cases, an enterprise demonstrates the 
availability of the external finance by obtaining a lender’s indication of its willingness to fund the plan. 
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FAS 2 





9. In accounting for a business combination, an acquisition is in substance different from a uniting of 
interests and the substance of the transaction needs to be reflected in the financial statements. Accordingly, a 
different accounting method is prescribed for each. 
10. In virtually all business combinations one of the combining enterprises obtains control over the other 
combining enterprise, thereby enabling an acquirer to be identified. Control is presumed to be obtained when 
one of the combining enterprises acquires more than one half of the voting rights of the other combining 
enterprise unless, in exceptional circumstances, it can be clearly demonstrated that such ownership does not 
constitute control. 
13. In exceptional circumstances, it may not be possible to identify an acquirer. Instead of a dominant party 
emerging, the shareholders of the combining enterprises join in a substantially equal arrangement to share 
control over the whole, or effectively the whole, of their net assets and operations. In addition, the 
managements of the combining enterprises participate in the management of the combined entity. As a 
result, the shareholders of the combining enterprises share mutually in the risks and benefits of the combined 
entity. Such business combination is accounted for as a uniting of interests. 
17. A business combination, which is an acquisition, should be accounted for by use of the purchase method 
of accounting as set out in the standards contained in paragraphs 19 to 76. 
43. Goodwill should be carried at cost less any accumulated amortization and any accumulated impairment 
losses. 
44. Goodwill should be amortized on a systematic basis over its useful life. The amortization period should 
reflect the best estimate of the period during which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the 
enterprise. There is a rebuttable presumption that the useful life of goodwill will not exceed twenty years 
from initial recognition. 
 
APB 16 
.102 Some combinations shall be accounted for by the purchase method and other combinations shall be 
accounted for by the pooling-of-interests method. The two methods are not alternatives in accounting for the 
same business combination. A single method shall be applied to an entire combination; the practice known 
as part-purchase, part-pooling is not acceptable. The acquisition of some or all of the stock held by minority 
stockholders of a subsidiary shall be accounted for by the purchase method rather than by the pooling-of-
interest method. 
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.103 The distinctive conditions that require pooling-of-interest accounting are described in paragraphs .104 
through .107 and combinations involving all of those conditions shall be accounted for as described in 
paragraphs .109 through .124. All other business combinations shall be treated as the acquisition of one 
enterprise by another and accounted for by the purchase method as described in paragraphs .125 through 
.166. 
.104 The pooling-of-interests method of accounting is intended to present as a single interest two or more 
common stockholder interests that were previously independent and the combined rights and risks 
represented by those interests. […] A business combination that meets all of the conditions specified and 
explained in paragraphs .105 through .107 shall be accounted for by the pooling-of-interest method. The 
conditions are classified by (a) attributes of the combining enterprises, (b) manner of combining interests, 
and (c) absence of planned transactions. 
.105 […] (a) Each of the combining enterprises is autonomous and has not been a subsidiary or division of 
another enterprise within two years before the plan of combination is initiated. 
(b) Each of the combining enterprises is independent of the other combining enterprises. 
.106 The combining of existing voting common stock interests by the exchange of stock is the essence of a 
business combination accounted for by the pooling-of-interests method. 
APB 17 
.110 The period of amortization shall not, however, exceed 40 years. Analysis at the time of acquisition may 
indicate that the indeterminate lives of some intangible assets are likely to exceed 40 years and the cost of 
those assets shall be amortized over the maximum period of 40 years, not an arbitrary shorter period. 
 
Employee Stock Option Plans 
IAS 19 
145. This standard does not specify recognition and measurement requirements for equity compensation 
benefits. 
152. In the absence of specific recognition and measurement requirements for equity compensation plans, 
information about the fair value of the reporting enterprise’s financial instruments used in such plans is 
useful to users of financial statements. However, because there is no consensus on the appropriate way to 
determine the fair value of share options, this standard does not require an enterprise to disclose their fair 
value. 
147. An enterprise should disclose: 
(a) the nature and terms (including any vesting provisions) of equity compensation plans; 
(b) the accounting policy for equity compensation plans; 
(c)the amounts recognized in the financial statements for equity compensation plans; … 
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APB 25 
.110 
Compensation for services that an employer receives as consideration for stock issued through employee 
stock option, purchase, and award plans shall be measured by the quoted market price of the stock at the 
measurement date less the amount, if any, that the employee is required to pay. 
.123 
Paragraphs .144 through .147 of Section C36 specify the disclosures related to stock based employee 































INTERCEPT -1.0042 0.7081 -1.3130 0.6184 -1.3053 0.6284 -0.5841 0.8349 -0.2641 0.9173
RD -1.1434 0.0595 * -0.8874 0.1326 -1.0848 0.0754 * -0.8138 0.1389 -1.3187 0.0337 **
ACQ 0.9542 0.0925 * 0.9806 0.0931 * 1.0954 0.0673 * 0.9767 0.0869 *
  ACQ LT 0.6210 0.3242
EMPRIOR -0.9235 0.0799 * -0.9913 0.0514 ** -0.9984 0.0547 ** -0.8824 0.1009 * -0.8909 0.0862 *
SALES -0.0838 0.7140 -0.0487 0.8292 -0.0648 0.7775 -0.1720 0.4708 -0.1524 0.4959
FLOAT 0.0193 0.1238 0.0211 0.0872 * 0.0174 0.1783 0.0215 0.0898 * 0.0207 0.1139
FOREIGN 1.7112 0.0172 ** 1.3946 0.0351 ** 1.7295 0.0166 ** 1.6928 0.0187 ** 1.9710 0.0055 **
INCSTOCK -2.0564 0.0086 ** -2.1381 0.0066 ** -2.2768 0.0034 ** -2.1371 0.0055 **
  DSTOCK -0.8777 0.0891 *
DEBT 0.1507 0.3496 0.0831 0.4608 0.1330 0.3725 0.1074 0.3803
  STDEBT 0.0752 0.2339
PERF -0.5656 0.3285 -0.7999 0.1894 -0.6144 0.5920 -0.6521 0.2745
  CASHFLOW -0.0826 0.8606
INDUSTRY 0.9880 0.0689 * 0.9164 0.0774 * 1.1127 0.0396 ** 1.0700 0.0514 **
  MANUFACT -0.5548 0.2920
Model χ² 32.70 ** Model χ² 27.77 ** Model χ² 29.61 ** Model χ² 33.85 ** Model χ² 32.55 **
Pseudo-R² 0.29 Pseudo-R² 0.23 Pseudo-R² 0.27 Pseudo-R² 0.31 Pseudo-R² 0.29
Concordant 77.2 % Concordant 76.8 % Concordant 78.6 % Concordant 79.7 % Concordant 78.2 %





APPENDIX 3: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FO  THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN THE CHOICE MODEL
RD 1 -0.0777 0.0462 -0.1985 0.1042 0.2916 -0.0602 -0.2867 -0.0122 -0.0305
ACQ 1 -0.0993 -0.0006 -0.0347 -0.0342 0.1666 0.0497 0.0741 0.0023
EMPRIOR 1 -0.0226 -0.0376 -0.0699 0.0092 0.0257 -0.1238 0.1777
SALES 1 -0.1317 -0.0234 -0.0251 0.3994 -0.1108 -0.2811
FLOAT 1 0.0618 0.0256 -0.1317 0.0648 -0.1172
FOREIGN 1 0.0483 0.0534 0.1902 0.1344
INCSTOCK 1 0.1075 0.0099 0.0709
PERF 1 -0.0437 -0.1479
DEBT 10 . 1 9 0 2
INDUSTRY 1
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